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ABSTRACT
IS HABITUAL BEHAVIOR DEPENDENT ON THE STABILITY OF THE
SITUATION IN WHICH IT ORIGINATED?
SEPTEMBER 2002
FRANKLIN CARVAJAL, B.A., CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY LONG BEACH
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor leek Aizen
The study investigated the effects of changes in environmental cues on habitual
behaviors. In the first stage, the researcher developed a procedure to form a habit based
on past theoretical formulations. Participants sorted title pages containing the word
attitude into a blue box and those containing the word habit into a red box until they were
able to do so quickly. In the second stage, the disruptive effects of cognitive load
(counting backwards in twos), changes in goal-relevant environmental cues (i.e., cues that
are necessary to achieve a goal) and changes in goal-irrelevant environmental cues (i.e.,
cues that are not necessary to achieve a goal) on the habit formed in the first stage were
examined. Changes in goal-relevant cues had a disruptive effect on habit while changes in
goal-irrelevant cues did not. Cognitive load also disrupted habit. However, it was the joint
effect of changes in goal-relevant cues and cognitive load that caused the greatest
disruption. It is concluded that habits should be conceptualized as mindless skills guided
by slightly controlled processes.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
For all of the credit habit receives as an all-encompassing explanation for
repetition and stability in human life, significant problems still exist in the habit
literature. First, the concept s meaning has changed throughout history, and every
change seems to involve the incorporation of new knowledge made possible by new
methodologies. To illustrate, experimental psychology introduced ways of studying
conscious and unconscious processes in a manner that was not possible before its
inception. This development gave birth to the study of automaticity and, in turn, to the
characterization of habit as automatic process. A second problem in the study of habit
is that it seems to be defined in as many ways as there are psychological orientations.
As such, the habit investigated by behaviorists is not the same as the one studied by
social psychologists.
Before the habit construct can be developed and its properties studied in the
laboratory, it must first be clearly defined. Therefore, this dissertation first documents
different ways scholars have conceived of habit in order to identify overlapping
characteristics fundamental to a definition of habit. The resulting set of definitional
attributes of course does not represent the convictions of any one orientation, and
should be taken as a working definition. This is a necessary first step toward
developing and testing hypotheses concerning this inchoate notion.
To impose some order on the conceptual morass engulfing the habit construct,
this document begins by classifying the diverse habit literatures into four groups.
The first group shares in common its focus on factors involved in the formation and
maintenance of habit. The second is interested in the characteristics of habits. The
third concentrates on the consequences of habits, and the fourth looks at the functions
of habits.
Factors Involved in the Formation and Maintenance of Habits
Personal Styles
Dewey (1943) as well as Mixon (1981) conceived of habits as styles: “Habit,
as I shall use the term, refers to the way or how, something characteristically is done.”
Habits as styles represent subject variables in the social (need for cognition),
personality (the big five personality factors), and clinical psychology (neurotic styles)
literatures.
Behavioral Repetition and Reinforcement
Behavioral repetition is by far the most commonly reported factor responsible
for the formation of habits (c.f., Bentler & Speckart, 1979; Baggozi, 1981; Fredricks
& Dossett, 1983; Boyd & Wandersman, 1991). According to this view, as reinforced
behaviors are repeated habits come into existence. This proposition has received
empirical support in the animal behavior literature. For example, Hull (1943) found a
positive correlation between behavioral repetition, reinforcement, and habits in rats
indicating that reinforced behaviors, such as lever pressing, tend to become habitual.
More recently, researchers interested in the effect of habit formation on changes in
rats’ neuroactivity have demonstrated rearrangements of patterns of striatum neuronal
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firing accompanying each phase of maze-learning (Mandar, Kubota, Connolly,
Hillegaart, & Graybiel, 1999). Striatum cluster of neurons are involved in the
initiation, maintenance, and termination of behaviors. Typically, in a maze-learning
task, rats initiate a behavior, detect an instruction (e.g., a tone), execute the instruction
(e.g., turn left), and receive reinforcements (e.g., food). At the beginning, striatum
neuronal patterns associated with each of the preceding sequence of events do not
differ in activity. That is, for each aspect of the task, about the same number of
striatum neurons fire. However, as the maze-learning behavior repeats, striatum
neuronal ensemblies involved only in the initiation of actions and reaching of goals
increase their firing rate while those involved in the intermediate steps decrease their
activity. If neurological activity is an indication of concurrent psychological activity,
then it seems that, at least for rats, initiation and reinforcement of behaviors play an
important role in the operations of habits (i.e., in behavioral repetition).
Situational Stability
The stability of situations in which habits originate also plays a role in their
formation and maintenance. Consistent with this claim, Ouelette & Wood (1998)
demonstrated that once habits are formed, the context in which they originate
primarily maintains and elicits them. They did so by conducting a meta-analytic
review suggesting that in stable contexts, frequency of past behaviors or habit
predicted future behaviors better than intentions did. However, in unstable
contexts
past behaviors became a poorer predictor of future behaviors compared to
intentions.
Ouellette and Wood further investigated the relationship between situational stability
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and habits. They operationalized stable contexts as daily performing the same
behaviors before carrying out two habitual behaviors: TV watching or recycling.
Conversely, unstable contexts represented daily performance of different behaviors
preceding the habitual behaviors. The findings supported their meta-analytic review
only for recycling but not for TV watching. When the same behaviors were daily
performed before recycling, past recycling predicted future recycling better than
intentions to recycle. Based on this evidence, these researchers concluded that in
stable contexts, habits predict future behaviors better than intentions; however, in
unstable contexts, intentions predict future behaviors better than habits. Ouelette and
Wood explained that the reason that stable contexts maintain habits is that they
contain environmental events that cue past behaviors.
Time
Time influences habit formation in that shortening the length of time allotted
to the learning and performance of novel behaviors forces the substitution of
controlled for less controlled processes. Because the learning of novel behaviors
require controlled processes, such as deliberation and behavioral monitoring, they
take more time than less controlled processes, such as trial and error. Without the
time necessary to engage in deliberation and behavioral monitoring, habitual
behaviors form via trial and error. This means that decreases in time consumption
necessary in controlled processes can be taken as an index of the
presence of less
controlled processes underlying habits.
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Characteristics of Habits
Habits are Difficult to Change
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) proposed that habits represented permanent
knowledge: “Habit is permanent and difficult to alter... is, it is agreed, abiding in its
character and difficult to displace... For Aristotle, the fundamental structural
qualities of habit were their permanency, pervasiveness, and inflexibility. James
(1890) explained habits as a consequence of the plasticity or “the possession of a
structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield at once”
of our brains. He went on to postulate an organic theory of habits: “habit in living
beings are due to the plasticity of the organic materials of which their bodies are
composed”(p. 105). James believed that repetitive cognitive and physical activity
created relatively inflexible nerve paths responsible for habits.
The idea that habits are difficult to change has also been explained at the
cognitive level. Accordingly, in stable situations, as schemas are repeatedly activated,
they acquire characteristics of habits, such as consistency and resistance to change
((Kahle & Beatty, 1987; Wittenbraker, Gibbs, & Kahle, 1983). Unfortunately, this
proposition has not been explicitly tested.
Habits Require Little Attention
Darwin (1872) claimed that thanks to habits “the most complex and difficult
movements can in time be performed with the least effort or consciousness . James
(1980) believed that habits “simplify the movements required to achieve a given
result, make them more accurate and diminish fatigue . However, the idea that habits
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require little attention took a more definite shape when Angell and Moore ( 1 896)
conducted experiments on the relation between attention and sensorial and motor
responses. These researchers asked participants to respond to three movements made
by a black screen with a white center or to three sounds communicated through a
telephone handset by either lifting a finger, moving a toe, or parting their lips. They
found that reaction time depended on the focus ol the participants attention. Focusing
attention on habituated sensory responses or habitual motor movements increased
reaction time while focusing attention on non-habituated responses decreased it. The
researchers reasoned that attending to responses had the effect of breaking them apart.
Since habituated responses were already tightly connected, focusing attention on them
meant effortfully inhibiting associated contents. They concluded that attention
integrated higher order units and that once these integrated units emerged habit took
care of them. They also argued that nonhabituated responses due to their not being
completely learned would exhibit less disruption than habituated ones. That is,
consciously guiding new sensory or motor responses by paying attention to these
responses allowed for faster responses compared to those that had become habits.
Therefore, habituated responses continued to occur at the same speed while
nonhabituated responses could increase speed because participants could consciously
increase the speed at which they responded. Angell and Addison’s believed that a
structural characteristic of habit was their ability to guide unconscious processes.
The relation between unconscious processes and habit continued to play a role
in psychological writings. Landis, Triandis, and Adamopoulus (1978) introduced a
theory in which conscious intentions and unconscious habits were initially responsible
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for behavior. Using questionnaire and observational data on schoolteachers, they
demonstrated that frequent repetition of nonverbal and verbal teaching behaviors
such as giving positive feedback, encouraging discussion, and criticizing students—
was more important than stated intentions to act in particular ways when predicting
future behavior. In other words, teachers exhibited verbal and nonverbal teaching
behaviors that seemed to be a function of habits formed as a consequence of having
performed these behaviors in the past, regardless of how they actually intended to
behave in class.
Triandis et al. drew the following conclusions. First, they reasoned that
because the teachers had little time to think about their verbal and nonverbal teaching
behaviors, these behaviors might have come about automatically without much
deliberation on the part of the teachers. Conversely, they proposed that if teachers had
been given time to reason about and deliberate on their behaviors, the resulting
actions would have been most likely the result of conscious planning and intentions.
This means that time is an important factor in the manifestation of habits because
without the necessary amount of time required for reasoning and deliberation, already
formed habits that take little if any time are more likely to be resorted to. There is a
second important conclusion Triandis et al. reached. They proposed that explaining
habit required a learning theory based on reinforcement history but intention entailed
a cognitive theory. It seems that according to Triandis et al., a principal characteristic
of habit is that its effect on behavior occurs fast and without much reasoning and
deliberation in situations where intentions cannot be formed.
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Running through much of the habit literature is the idea that the most
important characteristic of habits is their automaticity (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000;
Kahle & Beatty, 1987; Landis, Triandis, & Adamopoulus, 1978; Ouelette & Wood.
1998). As with other automatic processes, habits are said to run their course
involuntarily, unintentionally, unconsciously, and in parallel with other cognitive
processes. Unfortunately, this proposition has not been empirically tested in its
entirety by social psychologists.
Consequences of Habits
Habits Result in Associations between
States of Minds and Behavior
Darwin (1872) believed that habits result in associations between states of
mind and behaviors that were once reinforced: “there is a tendency through the force
of habit and association for the same movements to be performed... (p. 28).” Darwin
implied that by force of habit he actually meant repetition, and that it was the repeated
pairing of thoughts, emotions, and actions that gave rise to associations among
themselves. For Darwin, habits involved a process by which permanent, inflexible
clusters of associate thoughts, emotions, and actions originated, such that, whenever a
member became active it resulted in the unconscious and involuntary activation of
another member.
A number of contemporary researchers have experimentally tested the idea
that habits result in schemas consisting of behaviors and goals. For instance, Aarts
and Dijksterhuis (2000) showed that people automatically retrieve from memory
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behaviors they frequently engage in upon thinking of pursuing accompanying goals.
In their study, participants first read sentences containing different goals (e.g., going
shopping, going to a sport center, etc.) as part of a priming procedure designed to
activate schemas comprising behaviors and goals Then, they had to decide as fast as
possible whether a given transportation mode (bicycle, train, bus, etc.) was a realistic
means of getting to a previously presented location. Participants who frequently used
bicycles chose this mode of transportation to be a realistic means of reaching various
goal locations faster than participants who did not habitually ride bicycles. Aarts and
Dijksterhuis interpreted this finding as evidence that habits result in schemas
consisting of clusters of interdependent mental representations of goals, locations, and
behaviors. They further concluded that the activation of goals and their locations (e.g.,
shopping) automatically brings to mind goal-directed behaviors (bicycle riding).
Functions of Habits
Habits Free Cognitive Resources
A number of researchers believe that the main function of habits is to free
cognitive resources from being used in the guidance ot behaviors that have repeatedly
been carried out in the past. However, an explicit test ot this claim has not been
produced by social psychologists, with the exception ot a study showing that habits
result in a reduction in the amount ot intormation used in decisional tasks (Aarts,
Verplanken, & Knippenberg, 1998; Verplanken, Aarts, Knippenberg, & Knippenberg,
1994). This study demonstrated that people seek less information
when deciding on
using a means of transportation they have frequently chosen in the
past.
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Synthesis
Upon reading the above literature review, it becomes apparent that there is no
consensual definition for the habit construct. Therefore, it is important to clarify how
habit is defined in this study: a habit is a behavior that can be performed quickly,
accurately, and effortlessly. This type of behavior acquires these three characteristics
in the following manner. In stable situations, as reinforced behaviors are repeated
controlled processes are replaced with automatic ones. Initially, behaviors are learned
via on-line deliberation, computation, planning, monitoring, and reasoning, but with
practice, they form schemas that can be automatically retrieved from memory in the
presence of stable environmental cues. The nature of automatic processes underlying
habitual behavior is related to the latter being performed quickly, accurately, and
effortlessly. Furthermore, it seems that the transition from controlled to automatic
processes underlying habit allows for other mental operations to be performed
concurrently.
Habits and Environments
The process by which controlled processes are replaced with automatic ones
might involve environmental demands, such as time pressure. Time pressure might
force the recruitment of perceptual, cognitive, and motor strategies that take little
time. As such, perceptual strategies can be switched from controlled (scanning) to
automatic (instant recognition) as the perceptual component of the behavior
is
repeated. In the same way, cognitive strategies can be switched
from controlled
(planning) to more automatic (use of simple rules and heuristics).
Finally, motor
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strategies can also be switched from controlled (conscious monitoring of motor
movements) to automatic (skillful motor movements; Willingham, 1999). Switches
from controlled to automatic perceptual and cognitive strategies have been clearly
demonstrated in the cognitive literature (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin &
Schneider, 1977), as has been that of motor components (Bryan & Harter, 1 899).
Environments also determine what perceptual, cognitive, and motor strategies
should be attended to by informing organisms as to what strategies should be used to
attain their goals. Organisms attend to those environmental cues that are most likely
to inform their strategies and maximize their chances of reaching goals. These cues
vary with regard to how informative they are. At one extreme are relevant cues
indispensable to the attainment of goals while at the other extreme irrelevant cues that
play no role in the reaching of goals. Goal-relevant cues convey important
information needed for the successful attainment of goals whether learning is
accomplished by trial and error or conscious deliberation and regardless of the type of
perceptual, cognitive, or motor strategy used. These cues, therefore, must be attended
to if behavior is to be carried out accurately and successfully. Goal-irrelevant cues do
not play a part in the operation of habit, because they need not be attended to. These
cues are most likely suppressed as more goal-relevant cues are attended to.
The more goal-relevant cues change from one situation to another, the more
strategies have to be modified or replaced (e.g., a perceptual strategy may stay the
same, while its cognitive and motor counterparts change). Thus, changes in goal-
relevant cues should become apparent in longer response times, as these changes
require organisms to configure new strategies while suppressing old strategies in
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order to achieve their goals (Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000). Conversely, because
goal-irrelevant cues do not play a role in the attainment of goals, their modification
does not affect response latencies because organisms do not have to search for
suitable perceptual, cognitive, and motor strategies.
This dissertation tests two key assumptions made in the habit literature. The
first argues that the construct involves automatic processes while the second contends
that it is maintained by situational stability.
Hypotheses
1 . Changes in goal-relevant environmental cues disrupt habits. As goal-
relevant cues change a new situation arises in which already established
perceptual, cognitive, and motor strategies might be not appropriate to the
attainment of goals forcing their modification or replacement. This
modifying and replacing should take longer to carry out compared with no
modifications or replacements.
2. Changes in goal-irrelevant environmental cues do not disrupt habits
because no strategy modifications or replacements are necessary.
3. Concurrent mental operations in the form of cognitive load tasks should
not disrupt habits. If habit formation involves the switching of controlled
to automatic goal-directed perceptual, cognitive, and motor strategies, then
the introduction of a cognitive load task should not disrupt the behavior.
However, if even after habits are formed, performance of the behavior
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continues to require some degree of cognitive control, then the
introduction of the cognitive load task should have a disruptive effect.
4. Changes in goal-relevant environmental cues in conjunction with the
introduction of a cognitive load task should have the greatest disruptive
effect on habit. This should be the case because changes in goal-relevant
environmental cues and cognitive load task both require the use of
controlled processes demanding attentional resources. As such, these two
factors should compete for the use of controlled processes as well as
attentional resources.
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CHAPTER 2
HABIT FORMATION PILOT STUDY
Method
Before the effects ot changes in goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant
enviionmental cues on habits can be investigated the latter must first develop. Habits
develop in situations where behaviors are performed repeatedly in a stable context. To
simulate such an environment, participants were asked to sort documents into two
piles as accurately and quickly as possible. In line with past accounts of habit
formation, participants were reinforced via verbal encouragements and praises for
sorting quickly and accurately. At a theoretical level, the process underlying habit
formation involves controlled perceptual, cognitive, and motor strategies switching to
automatic ones. As individuals carry out behaviors repeatedly and quickly, they
search for perceptual, cognitive, and motor strategies conducive to the successful
achievement of their goals. Given time pressure, they must substitute effortful, time-
consuming controlled strategies for effortless, timesaving automatic ones to more
effectively cope with the problem of quickly performing behaviors while maintaining
accuracy in goal-attainment. This switch from controlled to less controlled strategies
should be indicated by increases in speed and accuracy and decreases in reported
effort.
Participants
Thirty-four University of Massachusetts psychology students participated in
the pilot study in exchange for course credit. The students sorted front-page journal
articles according to specific words contained in their title.
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Procedure
Students came to the laboratory to participate in a study on organizational
behavior. They read and signed informed consent forms that explained the purpose of
the study as being “to know more about the nature of office tasks”. The experimenter
then read the following instructions:
“We are interested in describing the nature of office tasks. To get a feel for
this, we have various groups who are to do different things so that we are able
to compare them. I have set up this room space to look like an office cubicle
(the room contains a desk with a half black and half white top). Here is your
chair and your desk. I would like you to imagine yourself being at your office
performing some routine tasks. Today, you are assigned to sort this stack of
documents into two piles. Your supervisor has instructed that if a document
contains the word habit in its title you are to place it in the red box , but if it
has the word attitude in its title then you are to place it in the blue box . As in
most other jobs, your place of employment offers incentives based on
employee’s merits. Your work offers a bonus of $50 for the person who sorts
the documents the fastest making the fewest errors. To approximate this
situation, I will ask you to sort the documents as quickly and as accurately as
you possibly can for a chance of winning the $50. In the case of a tie, the price
will be divided among the winners. I will play the role of supervisor. My role
is to time your performance and check for mistakes. Every time you sort a
certain amount of documents I will ask you to stop so that I can check your
performance. As soon as you have fulfilled the inventory requirements, 1 will
ask you to completely stop. At that point, we will carry out the second part of
the study.”
In sum, participants sorted as fast and as accurately as possible title pages
containing the word habit into a red box while those containing the word attitude into
a blue box . They sorted 20 trials each consisting of 10 randomly ordered journal
article title pages: five containing the word attitude and five the word habit. These
pages were the same and appeared in the same random order in every trial.
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After finishing each trial, participants stopped to be measured on speed and accuracy,
praised for their performance, and encouraged to do better. Upon finishing all 20
trials, the experimenter debriefed and thanked them. Upon analyzing the data, the
fastest participant was contacted and given the $50 prize.
Habit Formation Criterion Measures
Time Pressure
The experimenter encouraged participants to sort faster at the end of each trial.
This was done to force participants to rely more on trial and error learning and less on
deliberation and behavioral monitoring.
Reinforcements
At the outset of the pilot study, participants were informed of having a chance
of winning $50 for the best time and accuracy scores on the sorting task. In addition,
at the end of each trial, the experimenter praised participants for their performance.
Speed
Speed was defined as the time that it took participants to sort 10 title pages
equivalent to a trial. There were 20 trials each yielding a speed score. Speed scores
were averaged across the 34 participants for each trial resulting in 20 mean speed
scores. These mean speed scores decreased as the number of trials increased
indicating that participants gradually became faster at sorting the title pages (See
Figure 1). Furthermore, the magnitude with which the mean speed scores decreased
diminished as trials increased suggesting that participants reached an upper limit
determining how fast they could sort the title pages. More specifically, no gains in
speed were detected after the 13
lh
trial. Both the sequence graph (see Figure 1)
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and the results of the repeated measures associated Helmet contrast effects analysis
confirmed this to be the case. After the 13 Ih trial, each subsequent trial took just as
long as the one coming before or after.
Accuracy
Accuracy was defined as the number of title pages correctly sorted out within
a trial. They ranged from 0, meaning none of the title pages were sorted accurately, to
10, signifying all title pages were sorted correctly. The 20 trials yielded 20 accuracy
scores for each participant. These were averaged across participants in each trial to
produce 20 mean accuracy scores. Mean accuracy scores should increase as the
number of trials increase because people should get better at the task as they repeated
it. Participants should also reach an accuracy asymptote suggesting that they cannot
sort out title pages any more accurately. However, the results did not confirm the
preceding propositions. Mean accuracy scores reached an asymptote at the very
beginning of the study for all participants and stayed so until the end (See Figure 2.).
Repeated measures Helmet contrast analysis further validated the preceding finding.
For this reason, this measure was not included in the main study as a dependent
variable.
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Effortlessness
After the first trial and at the end of the last trial, participants rated on a seven-
point scale how effortful the sorting task felt to them (anchored at endpoints 1 = easy
<tnd 7 hard). A t-test conducted on this data did not demonstrate that participants
thought the task to be harder at the beginning (M - 2.3) than at the end of the pilot
study (M = 1
.85), t(34) = 1 .76, p = .09. It seems that overall participants thought the
task was quite easy (M = 2.1).
Discussion
Taken together, it seems that participants sacrifice speed for accuracy as they
learn to perform novel behaviors. Because participants did not take the sorting task as
becoming less effortful as they repeatedly carry it out this measure cannot be taken as
a reliable measure of habit formation. Therefore, the speed measure seems to be the
best indicator of the number of trials participants have to carry out before forming a
habit. Twenty trials were selected as the number of batches needed to form a sorting
habit despite, even though it only took 1 3 trials to reach an upper speed limit.
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CHAPTER 3
MAIN STUDY
Method
Participants
Two hundred and forty University of Massachusetts at Amherst students
participated in the main study in exchange for course credits.
Design
The study employed a 2 (cognitive load: present vs. absent) X 2 (stability of
goal-relevant environmental cue: stable vs. unstable) X 2 (stability of goal-irrelevant
environmental cue: stable vs. unstable) between-subjects experimental design. It took
place in two stages: In the habit formation stage, a habit for sorting title pages was
formed using the method developed in the pilot study. In the habit testing stage, the
independent variables of interest were introduced.
Habit Formation Stage
The study used the methodology described in the pilot study to form a sorting
habit. Participants sorted 20 batches of 10 journal title pages as fast and accurately as
they could. Each batch consisted of 5 title pages with the word attitude in the title and
5 with the word habit. All ten title pages were the same and appeared in the same
random order across trials. Participants sorted title pages containing the word habit
into a red box and those containing the word attitude into a blue box . Upon analyzing
the data, the fastest participant in the habit formation stage was contacted and given
the $50 prize.
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Habit Testing Stage
Independent Variables
Cognitive Load
Because cognitive load tasks vary with regard to what activities they interrupt
and to what extent they do so (Pashler, 1994), it is difficult to predict how they
interact with other activities, such as sorting. For this reason, this study included a
well-known cognitive load task developed by Baddeley and Vallar (1982) to study
memory processes, i.e., counting backwards in threes. However, because the pilot
study showed that it was too difficult for participants to do so, they were asked to
count backwards in twos instead. This task should not interfere with habits if their
performance involves automatic perceptual, cognitive, and motor strategies that can
run in parallel with other cognitive processes.
Stability of Goal-Relevant Environmental Cue
In the habit testing session, participants in the stable goal-relevant
environmental cue condition continued to sort title pages containing the word habi t
into a red box and those containing the word attitude into a blue box . In contrast,
participants in the unstable goal-relevant environmental cue condition sorted out title
pages containing the word cognition into a red box and those containing the work
stimulus into a blue box .
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Stability of Goal-Irrelevant Environmental Cue
In the habit testing session, participants in the stable goal-irrelevant
environmental cue condition continued to sort title pages on a black and white
desktop while those in the unstable goal-irrelevant environmental cue condition sorted
out the title pages on a yellow and green desktop.
Reinforcements
All participants received verbal encouragements after each trial, as well as an
incentive in the form of the possibility of winning an extra $50 for the fastest time.
Dependent Variable
Habit Speed Index
The researchers used a digital stopwatch to time participants. Participants
were timed from the point they began to the point they finished sorting a batch of 10
title pages. In total, each participant sorted out five batches of title pages. These pages
were the same and appeared in the same random order across trials. The five speed
scores corresponding to the five batches of sorted documents were then averaged into
a habit speed index.
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Procedure
Unlike in the habit formation stage in which participants sorted 20 batches, in
the habit testing stage they sorted out 5 batches. Since 5 batches were 25% of the
batches sorted in the habit formation stage, it seemed enough to yield a reliable speed
measure to account for random fluctuations in response times in the habit testing
stage.
Participants in the cognitive load condition (n = 120) received the following
instructions:
“Now that you have fulfilled the inventory requirements, your supervisor asks
you to sort out more of the same documents you sorted out before. Your work
offers a second $50 bonus for the person that this time sorts the documents the
fastest making the fewest errors. As before, I will ask you to sort the
documents as quickly and as accurately as you possibly can for a chance of
winning another $50. However, this time you are preoccupied thinking about
something important you have to do as soon as you leave work. To simulate
your being busy thinking about something else as you do your work at the
office, you will carry out the same task as before while you count backwards
in twos from 100. That is, 100, 98, 96, 92, 90, etc. If you get to the number 0,
please start all over again from 100. 1 am going to let you say the numbers out
loud while I keep track of them. Do not focus too much on what you are
saying; just try to count backwards and sort at the same time as fast as you
can. It is important that you do not stop counting backwards in twos, no matter
what happens. OK, let us begin.”
Upon analyzing the data, the fastest participant in the habit testing stage was
contacted and given the $50 prize.
Participants in the absent cognitive-load condition (n = 120) did not count
backwards; they just continued sorting documents.
Participants in the stable goal-relevant environmental cue condition (n = 1 20)
continued to place documents with the word habit in their title in a red box and
documents with the word attitude in their title in a blue box. Participants in the
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unstable goal-relevant environmental cue condition (n =120) sorted out documents
with the word cognition in their title into a red box and those with the word stimulus
into a blue box.
Participants in the stable goal-irrelevant environmental cue condition (n =
120) continued to sort out documents on a black and white desktop while those in the
unstable goal-irrelevant environmental cue condition (n = 120) sorted out documents
on a yellow and green desktop.
At the end oi the habit testing stage, participants were debriefed and thanked
for their participation.
Results
Habit Formation Data
It is important that experimental conditions did not differ in the habit
formation stage, because the results obtained in the habit testing stage could be a
product of already established differences in the habit formation stage. To do so, an
analysis of variance was performed on the habit formation data with habit stability of
goal-relevant environmental cues (stable vs. unstable), stability of goal-irrelevant
environmental cues (stable vs. unstable), and cognitive load (present vs. absent) as
between-subjects factors. This analysis yielded no main effects or interactions
demonstrating that indeed the conditions did not differ in mean time latencies in the
habit formation stage.
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Habit Testing Data
1 he data from the main study was submitted to a 3-way analysis of variance,
with stability of goal-relevant environmental cues (stable vs. unstable), stability of
goal-irrelevant environmental cues (stable vs. unstable), and cognitive load (present
vs. absent) as between-subjects factors.
As expected, the stability of goal-relevant cues disrupted the operations of
habit (F( 1,226) — 129.01, p < -01), but the stability ot goal-irrelevant cues did not
(F( 1,226) = .1 19, p > .05). This main effect for goal-relevant environmental cues
indicated that participants who continued to sort the title pages containing the words
attitude and habit did so faster (M = 12.3) than participants who had to sort the two
new target words stimulus and cognition (M = 17.7).
That the stability of goal-irrelevant cues did not affect habit was further
confirmed by the lack of a stability of goal-irrelevant cues by stability of goal-relevant
cues interaction F( 1,226) = .316, p > .05. Participants who continued to sort the words
habit and attitude on white and black backgrounds did so at the same speed (M =
12.09) as those who sorted the same two words on yellow and green backgrounds (M
= 12.59). The same pattern emerged for participants who sorted the two new target
words, stimulus and cognition, on white and black backgrounds doing so at the same
speed (M = 1 7.82) as those who sorted these two new words on yellow and green
backgrounds (M = 17.64).
With regard to cognitive load, counting backwards in twos disrupted the
operations of habit in that a main effect for cognitive load emerged with participants
who counted backwards in twos sorting significantly slower (M = 18.8) than
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participants who did not (M = 1 1 .3), F(l ,226) = 244.1 3, p < .01 . It seems that
engaging in controlled processes, such as counting backwards in twos, disrupts habit
even when goal-relevant cues remain stable. For instance, participants who continued
to sort the words attitude and habit while counting backwards in twos did so
significantly slower (M = 15.3) compared with participants who also continued to sort
the same two words but did not count backwards (M = 9.3).
Finally, the data yielded a cognitive load by stability of goal-relevant cues
interaction suggesting that changes in goal-relevant cues had a greater disrupting
effect when cognitive load was present than when it was absent F( 1,226) = 8.92, p <
.01 (see Figure 3). As expected, changes in goal-relevant cues had a disruptive effect
on habits when cognitive load was absent as indicated by the tendency for participants
who did not count backwards and sorted new words (stimulus and cognition) doing so
more slowly (M = 13.3) than participants who also did not count backwards but
continued to sort old words (habit and attitude) (M = 9.3). However, changes in goal-
relevant cues had a an even greater disruptive effect on habits when cognitive load
was present as suggested by the fact that participants who counted backward and
sorted new words did so much more slowly (M = 22.2) than participants who also
counted backwards but continued to sort old words (M = 15.3).
25
CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
Overall Discussion
Although at first sight the habit phenomenon looks rather simple, on closer
examination it turns out to be rather complicated. This complexity is reflected in the
number of psychological disciplines that can be said to have dealt either directly or
indirectly with the habit issue. Behaviorists have thought of this issue in terms of
stimulus-response associative learning (Hull, 1943; Yerkes, & Dodson 1908);
neuropsychologists in terms of neural representations (Jog, Kubota, Connolly,
Hillegaart, & Graybiel 1999); cognitive psychologists in terms of scripts (Schank &
Abelson, 1977); motor control researchers in terms of motor programs and reflexes
(Kelso & Stelmach 1976); and social psychologists in terms of controlled versus
automatic processes (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Aarts, Verplanken, & van
Knippenberg, 1998; Bargh, 1989; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider,
1977).
The numbers of psychological disciplines that have dealt directly or indirectly
with the habit issue not only point to its complexity but also to its importance. In fact,
so important is the idea of automatic processes, such as habits, for social
psychologists that half chapter has been devoted to them in the latest edition ot the
Handbook of Social Psychology (Wegner & Bargh, 1998). This renewed interest in
automatic processes have motivated contemporary researchers to propose that because
habits are automatic processes they predict frequently repeated behaviors better
than
deliberative controlled processes do (cf. Bagozzi, 1981; Bentler & Speckart, 1979,
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Boyd & Wandersman, 1991; Fredricks & Dossett, 1983; Landis, Triandis, &
Adamopoulos, 1978). It is often implied by this claim that repeated behaviors result
and are brought about by automatic processes occurring outside conscious awareness,
such as habits; however, this study demonstrates that habits might involve at best a
transition from more controlled to less controlled processes.
The claim that habit is an automatic process could not be confirmed according
to the automaticity criteria tested in the present study. The findings indicate that habit
is not an automatic process in the sense that it does not operate in parallel with other
mental processes. Because cognitive load disrupted the sorting task, it is difficult to
argue that habit involves the utilization of perceptual, cognitive, and motor strategies
that can run in parallel with other strategies. However, it is still possible that some
controlled strategies were replaced with less controlled ones while others were not.
For instance, it is likely that controlled perceptual and cognitive strategies were
replaced with less controlled ones or needed less attentional resources while motor
strategies did not. If this was the case, then the concurrent mental operation (cognitive
load) could have disrupted the more controlled motor strategy while leaving
unperturbed the less controlled perceptual and cognitive ones. This is consistent with
the conclusions Angell and Moore (1896) drew in their studies on the relation
between habits and attention. They effectively proposed that habits support behavioral
components that need very little conscious guidance. If some strategies cannot
become less controlled, then, it is difficult for habits to play a role in their execution.
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The cognitive load disruption also indicates that habits are not as inflexible
and hard to change as it is often stated. It seems that instead the transition from
controlled to less controlled strategies is the best way to think about the formation and
operation of habits, because conceptualizing them as automatic strategies contradicts
the present findings. This could mean that habits are slightly controlled, but not
completely mindless ways of acting and not necessarily totally uncontrolled,
automatic actions.
As it was expected, environmental cues necessary to the attainment of goals
disrupted the operation of habits while those unnecessary for the achievement of goals
did not. Longer response times with changes in goal-relevant environmental cues may
indicate searches in more adaptive semi-controlled strategies and failures in
modifications of already established ones. Concurrent mental operations in
conjunction with changes in relevant cues seem to disrupt habits the most. This
phenomenon is expected if changes in goal-relevant cues force the recruiting of only
those controlled processes needed to deal with the problems involved in the newly
created situation. This new situation does not demand that all of the automatic
processes engaged in the original situation be changed because many of its features
stay the same. That is, the only thing that changed in the new situation was the words
contained in the title pages perhaps allowing the use of automatic strategies that
worked in the original situation: perceptual strategies such as scanning titles instead
reading them or cognitive strategies such as simple heuristics (e.g., stimulus = left
tray). This means that some controlled strategies were needed to deal with the new
situation and that a possibility exists that the cognitive load task required similar
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strategies. Since changes in goal-relevant cues and the cognitive load task required the
same controlled strategies only one of them could use them at a time increasing the
amount of time to finish the sorting task.
It should be noted that the interpretation of the data yielded by the interaction
between goal-relevant cues and cognitive load is subject to the type of metric used. In
this case, the metric based on absolute rather than relative changes in units of time
may have be responsible for the interaction effect, such as that substituting it for
another metric
—
percentages or logarithms—would make this interaction effect
disappear. That is, there are differences across the four conditions regarding the
average number of seconds it took to carry out the sorting task but when percentages
are used to interpret these differences a new picture emerges. In this case, the
percentage change representing the difference between participants who sorted old
words versus those who sorted new words was exactly the same as the percentage
between participants who sorted new words and those who sorted new words and
counted backwards. More specifically, it took participants who sorted new words
(stimulus, cognition) on average 13 seconds to sort the documents compared to the 9
seconds it took participants who sorted old words (attitude, habit), this is a difference
of 4 seconds. This difference is much smaller than the difference between participants
who counted backwards (15 seconds) and participants who counted backwards and
sorted new words (22 seconds)—a difference of 7 seconds. In absolute time units, 4
seconds is smaller than 7 seconds; however, in terms of percentage change, an
increase from 9 seconds to 13 seconds is equivalent to a 69% increase in latency
while an increase from 15 to 22 seconds is exactly the same, 69% increase in latency.
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This means that the findings are tenable according to the metric used, absolute time in
seconds, but if a different metric is used the interaction between goal-relevant cues
and cognitive load would disappear.
Conclusions
It is no wonder that habit continues to generate scientific debate. Points of
disagi cement indicate a lack of consensus on how to best inter the existence of this
hypothetical construct from behavioral observations. The typical operationalization of
habit as behavioral frequency presupposes that the construct is responsible for
repetition in behaviors. However, many other psychological factors, such as
personality traits, attitudes, schemas, etc., also contribute to the consistency behaviors
exhibit. This creates the necessity to find ways to identify and thus separate habit
from other variables that may also result in behavioral repetition. This study
addressed this issue by identifying three phenomenological characteristics
experienced as behaviors are frequently repeated that set these behaviors apart from
those guided by constructs other than habit. These habit subjective markers take the
form of behaviors that are performed quickly, accurately, and effortlessly. Although
all behaviors can in principle be repeated due to variables other than habit, its
construct validity resides in the fact that its corresponding class of behaviors exhibits
three principal qualities: quickness, accuracy, and effortlessness.
A second point of discussion concerns the issue of automaticity. To say that
habit is an automatic process raises the question regarding what exactly becomes
automatic. If habit is supported by automatic processes, these must be clearly
identified and separated from each other by first grouping them into cognitive.
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perceptual, and motor categories. Once this is done, the next task is to understand
which of these component processes become automatic and which ones resist
automatization. To do so, it may be necessary to classify behaviors at different levels
of complexity and hypothesized what processes could realistically become automatic
at each level. For instance, are the processes involved in lifting a finger just as
amenable to automatization as those underlying the movement of hands or arms? This
is an important issue for it will inform interventions aimed at changing habit by
indicating how to weaken its strength by deautomatizing undesirable automatic
behavioral components and consciously changing controlled ones. In order to disrupt
perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes underlying habitual behaviors the
environment should be manipulated so that such processes become ineffective ways
of attaining goals. To achieve this goal, it may be necessary to focus one’s energy on
modifying goal-relevant environmental cues because they are indispensable to the
operation of habitual behaviors. The main message to take home from this
dissertation work is that habit may be difficult but not impossible to change if it is
carefully studied and fully understood.
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Table 1
Mean Sorting Times and Standard Deviations as a Function of Changes in Goal-
Irrelevant Cues, Goal-Relevant Cues, and Cognitive Load
Stable Goal-Irrelevant Cues
StableGoal-Relevant Cues Unstable Goal-Relevant Cues
Cognitive Load M SD n M SD n
Absent 9.8 1.4 29 13.4 2.2 30
Present 14.4 3.1 29 22.3 5.7 30
Unstable Goal-Irrelevant Cues
StableGoal-Relevant Cues Unstable Goal-Relevant Cues
Cognitive Load M SD n M SD n
Absent 8.8 1.2 28 13.2 2.5 30
Present 16.3 5.2 29 22.2 4.8 29
Note. Cell means and standard deviations units are in seconds.
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Time
Figure 1. Sorting time in seconds as a function of number of trials (n = 40). In each
trial, participants sorted 10 randomly ordered title pages as fast as they could.
Trial
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Pages
Figure 2. Number of correctly sorted trials as a function of number of trials (n = 40).
Trial
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Figure 3. Mean sorting time in seconds as a function of changes in goal-relevant
environmental cues and cognitive load.
Absent Present
Cognitive Load
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